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EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: THE CASE OF TAIWAN
Nuno Garoupa, Veronica Grembi and Shirley Ching-ping Lint
Abstract: This paper extends the empirical analysis of the determinants of
judicial behavior by considering the Taiwanese case. Taiwan is a particularly interesting
case because the establishment and development of constitutional review corresponds to
a political transition from an authoritarian regime dominated by one party to an emerging
democracy. We test the attitudinal hypothesis by making use of a new dataset of ninetyseven decisions issued by the Taiwanese constitutional court in the period between 1988
and 2008. The attitudinal hypothesis is that the Taiwanese constitutional judges respond
to party interests, either because their preferences coincide with the appointer or because
they want to exhibit loyalty to the appointer. Our econometric analysis does not provide
strong evidence for the attitudinal hypothesis. However, we provide an explanation.
Faced with a transition from a one-party political regime to a democracy, the Taiwanese
Grand Justices needed to assert their independence from the other branches of
government and gain credibility, thus dissenting more often, periodically and individually
voting against the interests of the dominant party.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial behavior has become an important field of study for legal
economists, political scientists, and lawyers.' At the same time, the
importance and role of constitutional courts has attracted the attention of
scholars and policymakers. Any theory of constitutional review requires a
significant understanding of judicial behavior. In fact, the appropriate
design of constitutional review plays an important role in political stability,

t Nuno Garoupa, UIUC College of Law; Veronica Grembi, Universith Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
(Milan); Shirley Ching-ping Lin, SID Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law. Address
correspondence to Nuno Garoupa at the University of Illinois College of Law, 504 E. Pennsylvania
Avenue, Champaign, Illinois 61820, United States of America, or to ngaroupa@illinois.edu. The authors
are grateful to Wen-cheng Chang, Shao Dan, Ted Eisenberg, Tom Ginsburg, K. C. Huang, David Law,
Tom Miles, Mark Ramseyer, Lydia Brashear Tiede, Tay-sheng Wan and the participants at the Fifth
Conference of Empirical Legal Studies (USC, 2009) for their useful comments and suggestions. Nuno
Garoupa acknowledges financial support by FCT, PPCDT/JUR/55752/2006. We are also grateful to Rachel
Jo-yu Chen, Tzu-Te Wen and Jessie Chien-yu Hsu for superb research assistantship. And we are grateful
to Caroline Belloff and Roya H. Samarghandi for reviewing the paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
' For further discussion, see Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, IdeologicalPosition as a Variable in
the Authoring of Dissenting Opinions on the Warren and Burger Courts, 16 AM. POL. Q. 317, 317-328
(1988); Albert D. Cover & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCL. REV. 557, 557-565 (1989); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE (CQ Press 1997); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002); THOMAS G.. HANSFORD & JAMES F.
SPRIGGS, II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
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consolidation of democracy, and economic growth. 2 Judicial decisionmaking in a constitutional court is the result of multiple variables, including:
1) personal attributes, 2) attitudes (including policy preferences in the
relevant dimensions), 3) peer pressure and intra-court interaction (a natural
pressure for consensus and court reputation; a common objective for the
constitutional court to achieve supremacy over competing political and
judicial powers), and 4) party politics (loyalty to the appointer) within a
given constitutional and doctrinal environment (for example, more or less
formalist).4 The relative importance of these variables varies across
explanatory theories. A pure formalist does not recognize personal attributes
or ideological preferences as a powerful explanatory variable of judicial
behavior. A supporter of the attitudinal model does not recognize the
institutional and doctrinal environment as a serious constraint to
preferences.6 A supporter of the principal-agent model sees intra-court as
well as competing powers derived from government interaction as a major
limitation to ideological advancements of the agent.
Furthermore, some explanatory variables may have multiple
interpretations. For example, there are at least two possible explanations for
the conformity between constitutional judges and party interests. First,
constitutional judges often exhibit the same preferences as the political party
that they affiliate with. Second, when the constitutional judges do not have
lifetime appointments, they might want to maintain good relations with the
party that selected them in the hope of securing future appointments to the
court or elsewhere (regardless of whether the terms are renewable or not).
Both reasons suggest that judges are incentivized by their political biases
2 For a good introduction, see Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and Design of Constitutional
Courts, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 49 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Economic Analysis].
3 For judicial preferences, see Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special about Judges?,61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 773 (1990); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize?]; Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1259 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, Judicial Behavior]; Laurence Baum, What Judges Want:
Judges' Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. RES. Q. 749 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Incentives,
Reputation, and the Inglorious DeterminantsofJudicial Behavior,68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (2000).
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tracey E. George, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86
AM. POL. Sc. REv. 323 (1992); Charles M. Cameron & Jeffrey R. Lax, Bargaining and Opinion
Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2007).
5 Id.
6 Id.
See sources cited supra note 1; see also Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Allan Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The
Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. ScL. 362 (2001); Brian Goff, Supreme Court
Consensus and Dissent: Estimating the Role of the Selection Screen, 127 PUB. CHOICE 367 (2006); JoHN
HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIo PgREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (Stanford Univ. Press 2007)
(discussing pressure for consensus in the civil law tradition).
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and are not fully insulated from the political system. However, the basis for
those political biases differs; the biases can be rooted in personal preferences
or in strategic opportunism.
It is no surprise that the process of recruitment and appointment of
judges is a major variable in the design of constitutional courts. Some
scholars assert that, as expected, overly party-oriented mechanisms are
especially bad for independent judicial review, 8 but are quite likely to
smooth conflicts with other bodies of governance. Cooperative mechanisms
that require a supermajority deliver consensual constitutional courts that are
more deliberative than active lawmakers.9
These issues cannot be settled without solid empirical analysis.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been the focus of much attention by
legal scholars,'o empirical debates about other constitutional courts are
This paper extends the
almost nonexistent, with notable exceptions."
empirical analysis of judicial behavior by analyzing the Taiwanese case.
8 For theories of judicial independence, see William M. Landeis & Richard Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Richard A. Epstein,
The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice, 1990 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L.
REv. 827; J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994).
9 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW].
'0 See e.g. sources cited supra notes 1 & 7.
1 On Japan and the Japanese Supreme Court, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN,
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2003); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Casefor Managed Judges: Learningfrom Japan
after the Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1879 (2006). On Canada, see Benjamin Alarie &
Andrew Green, Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality, and Appointments to the
Supreme Court of Canada,58 UNIV. NEW BRUNSWICK L. J. 73 (2008); Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green,
Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada,47 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 1
(2009). On Australia, see Paresh Kumar Narayan & Russell Smyth, Hail to the Chief! Leadership and
Structural Change in the Level of Consensus on the High Court of Australia, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
399 (2004); Paresh Kumar Narayan & Russell Smyth, What Explains Dissent on the High Court of
Australia? An Empirical Assessment Using a Cointegration and Error Correction Approach, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2007). On Germany, see Martin R. Schneider, Judicial Career Incentives
and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German Labour Courts of Appeal, 20 EUR. J. L. &
EcON. 127 (2005); GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY (Cambridge

Univ. Press 2005). On Italy, see Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, The Independence of the Italian
Constitutional Court, 14 CONST. POL. ECON. 319 (2003); Nadio Fiorino, Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra,
The Determinants of Judicial Independence: Evidence from the Italian ConstitutionalCourt (1956-2002),
163 J. INsTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 683 (2007). On France, see RAPHAEL FRANCK, WHEN
JUDGES RULE ON THE VALIDITY OF ELECTIONS, ARE THEY PARTISAN? AN EXAMINATION OF THE DECISIONS

OF THE FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1958-2005 (2008) [hereinafter FRANCK, WHEN JUDGES RULE];
Raphael Franck, Judicial Independence under a Divided Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French
Constitutional Court, 1959-2006, 25 J. LAW, EcON. & ORG. 262 (2009). On Portugal, see Sofia Amaral
Garcia, Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian
Constitutional Courts: the Case of Portugal(July 7, 2008) (U. Ill. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. LEO8-2,),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 156281 (last visited Nov. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter Garcia, Garoupa & Grembi, 2008]; Sofia Amaral Garcia, Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi,
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Taiwan is a particularly interesting case because the establishment and
development of constitutional review corresponds to a transition from an
authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy.12 Other scholars have
identified the case of Taiwan as one of success where the constitutional court
has increasingly assumed a relevant role, but at the same time has been able
to avoid excessive backlash from the political actors.13
The Taiwanese Constitution ("Constitution" or "ROC Constitution")
is one of the oldest present constitutions in the world. Similarly, the
Taiwanese constitutional court (also known as the "Council of Grand
Justices" or "Council") almost predates all the other specialized
constitutional courts. Although composition and competences have been
reformed in the last fifty years, the Taiwanese constitutional court is not a
new product, as are its counterparts in many third-wave democracies (for
example, Spain, Portugal, Eastern European countries, and Chile), but an
institution that has prevailed throughout the authoritarian period and the
more recent emerging democracy. The age and the role of the Taiwanese
constitutional court make it quite different from other constitutional courts
around the world, and therefore very unique for empirical analysis.
In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics, the Council of
Grand Justices follows the centralized model (also referred to as the
"Austrian," "Kelsenian," or "European" model) of constitutional reviewl4
rather than the decentralized review system of the United States or Japan.
The Council was founded in China in 1948 and retreated with the ROC

Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian ConstitutionalCourts: the Case of Portugal,6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2009) [hereinafter Garcia, Garoupa & Grembi, 2009]. On Spain, see Nuno
Garoupa, Fernando Gomez Pomar & Veronica Grembi, Judging under Political Pressure: An Empirical

Analysis of the Constitutional Review Vote in the Spanish Constitutional Court (2009) (unpublished
mimeograph, on file with authors).
12 On other transitions, see GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS,
AND PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS
IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); R. BILL
CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARGENTINA (Stanford

Univ. Press 2004).
" See GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 9, at 106.
14 See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465-66
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 2006). The Council portrays itself as a "model similar to the German and Austrian
system." See Sifayuan Shizi Di 419 [Interpretation No. 419] (Constitutional Court, Dec. 31, 1996)
(Taiwan). The majority opinions of the Judicial Yuan Interpretations have been translated into English and
at
Yuan,
Judicial
the
site
of
web
at
the
available
are
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/CONSTITUTIONALCOURT/en/p03.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). No
separate reference to the web site or transliterated Chinese case names will be provided hereafter in this

article.

JANUARY 201 1

EXPLAINING CONSTITUTiONAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

5

government to Taiwan in 1949. Prior to 2003, the Council was composed
of seventeen Grand Justices who were appointed by the President with
approval of the Control Yuan (1948-1992) or the National Assembly (19922000),16 and served renewable terms of nine years. The Presidents of the
Judicial Yuan presided over the Council meetings, even though they were
Now the number of Grand Justices is
not Grand Justices at the time.
reduced to fifteen, and the President and the Vice President of the Judicial
Yuan must be Grand Justices at the same time. Except for the eight Justices
appointed in 2003 serving for four years, the Justices are now appointed by
the President with the majority consent of the Legislative Yuan, and serve
non-renewable terms of eight years. Since half of the Justices are renewed
every four years, theoretically, each President has the chance to appoint
seven or eight Justices during his or her four-year term.
The importance of the Council and the significant role it plays in
Taiwan makes it an interesting framework to pursue an empirical analysis of
judicial behavior. Our research tested the attitudinal model in the Council of
Grand Justices in the period between 1988 and 2008. We hypothesized that
the Taiwanese constitutional judges respond to party interests, either because
their preferences coincide with the appointer or because they want to exhibit
loyalty to the appointer. Given the disproportional influence of the Chinese
Nationalist Party ("KMT" or "Kuomintang") in the appointment process
throughout most of the period, we expected the Grand Justices appointed by
KMT Presidents (in 1985, 1994 and 1999) to favor KMT interests. At the
same time, we expected the Grand Justices appointed by the President
supported by the Democratic Progressive Party ("DPP"), the major
opposition to KMT, (in 2003 and 2007) to disfavor KMT interests.
However, given that the opposition never actually dominated the relevant
confirming body (i.e. the Control Yuan, the National Assembly, or the
1s See Y. S. Weng, Woguo Shixianzhidu thi Tezheng yu Zhanwang [The Featuresand Prospects of
the Republic of China (ROC) Constitutional Review System], in SlFAYUAN DAFAGUAN SHIEXIAN
WUSHIZHOUNIAN JINIAN LUNWENJI [ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS BY THE GRAND JUSTICES OF THE JUDICIAL YUAN] 297 (Dept. of Clerks

for the Justices of the Constitutional Court ed. 2000).
16 Sifayuan Zhuzhifa [The Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan] [hereinafter "OAJY"] art. 3 (1947)
(amended 2001), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p07_2.asp?awno=81 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2009); see also MINGUO XIANFA (1947); Interpretation No. 541 (Apr. 4, 2002), Judicial

Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
7 See OAJY, supra note 16, at arts. 3 (1), 3 (2), 5 (2); see also Thomas Weishing Huang, Judicial
Activism in the Transitional Polity: The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.
J. 1, 6 (2005) [hereinafter Huang, Judicial Activism].
18 See MINGUO XIANFA, Additional Articles (2000); see also MINGUO XIANFA art. 5. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that the Justices who serve as president and vice president of the Judicial Yuan do not enjoy the
guarantee of an eight-year term. MINGUO XIANFA art. 5(2).
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Legislative Yuan), we expected the second effect (alignment between the
interests of the opposition and the voting patterns of justices appointed by
the DPP President) to be less significant than the first effect (alignment
between the interests of the KMT and the voting patterns of justices
appointed by the KMT Presidents). Under this hypothesis, the affiliation of
the Grand Justices, as measured by the President who appointed them, is a
good predictor of their voting patterns in the court.' 9
The appointment mechanism, as mentioned above, is heavily
dominated by the President and the political parties of the relevant
confirming body (under the influence of the KMT and its allies). In this
case, the choice of Grand Justices should correspond to the preferences of
the appointing President given the position of the Control Yuan, the National
Assembly or the Legislative Yuan (which is supposed to pose little problem
for the KMT Presidents but could exert certain influence in the case of DPP
President Chen). Hence, we expected preferences to largely coincide.
Moreover, the Grand Justices have limited tenure and before 2003, there was
the possibility of reappointment. Thus, we also expected that these two
factors would reinforce the possibility that the Grand Justices would
seriously take the appointer's interests into consideration.
We tested our attitudinal hypothesis by making use of a new dataset
The dataset includes ninety-seven decisions
that we constructed.
("interpretations") issued by the Taiwanese constitutional court in the period
between 1988 and 2008. We chose July 15, 1987, the date of the lifting of
martial law in Taiwan, as the initial period because it corresponds to the start
of the transition from the traditional authoritarian period to an emerging
democracy. These interpretations are cases where the petitioners can be
easily identified with a certain political interest (in particular, affiliated with
the KMT and its allies or with the opposition). However, unlike the
American model, the Taiwanese constitutional court does not entertain
concrete review, but rather abstract review when it delivers a constitutional
interpretation. Therefore, all the cases we have selected not only are abstract
in nature but can be easily associated with political interests, as explained in
more detail in the following Part. If the attitudinal model has strong support
in Taiwan, these cases should be the ones to present significant evidence.
In order to test our hypotheses, we considered two different explained
variables: 1) the decision whether or not to vote for constitutionality, and 2)
the existence of dissenting opinions. Under our hypothesis, dissent should
19 The Presidents of Taiwan have been Chiang Kai-shek (1950-1975, KNIT), Yen Chia-kan (19751978, KMT), Chiang Ching-kuo (1978-1988, KMT), Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000, KNIT), Chen Shui-bian
(2000-2008, DPP), and Ma Ying-jeou (since 2008, KNIT).
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increase as the opposition becomes more influential in the appointment of
Grand Justices. The Council was initially composed of the Grand Justices
appointed by the KMT Presidents, and DPP President-appointed Grand
Justices came into existence at the later stages (even though the DPP never
dominated the political body confirming presidential nominations). Hence,
if there is party alignment, we should observe more dissent at the later
stages. As to the decision whether or not to vote for constitutionality, it
should depend on the petitioner. When the petitioner is KMT-related, we
expected that KMT President-appointed Grand Justices would vote for
unconstitutionality (thus favoring the interests of the petitioner).
Our research shows that, although political variables do play a role in
explaining the decisions made by the Council, this role is quite limited and
certainly does not show notable party alignment (we test in the particular
party alignment with the traditional ruling party, KMT).20 Overall, the
Taiwanese constitutional court seems to be fairly insulated from main party
interests. Our empirical research did not find any strong systematic
interference of ideology or other political variables.
In addition, our results point to other explanations for the Council's
behavior, such as a judicial concern with advancing the reputation of the
court. Moreover, since dissent has become much more likely as the KMT
loses its political influence and as the likelihood of the opposition gaining
the presidency increases, i.e. during the political transition, we show that the
alignment of interests between the Council and political parties weakened in
the transition (mid-1990s to early 2000s) but was stronger before the
transition period.
Our paper makes three main contributions to the growing comparative
empirical studies on constitutional courts. First, it tests the attitudinal model
outside the courts of the United States. Second, it provides evidence about
pre- and post-transitional judicial behavior. Third, it discusses conditions
under which judges in a particular court restrain their ideological biases and
pursue other (more collective) interests.
In Part 1I of this paper, we briefly discuss the case of Taiwan and the
current empirical debates. In Part Hl, we present our empirical results. The
results are discussed further in Part IV. Part V concludes the paper.

20 Notice that we do not assign Justices to the KMT or the opposition (DPP), but rather control for
which President appointed each Justice. Hence, we can distinguish between Justices appointed before the
beginning of the transition (i.e., 1985 and before) and the ones appointed after democracy was introduced
(i.e., 1994, 1999, 2003 and 2007).
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THE CASE OF TAIWAN

Taiwan underwent nearly one hundred years of colonial and
authoritarian rule before transforming into an emerging democracy in the
1990s.21 More specifically, Taiwan was ceded by Imperial China (the Ching
Dynasty) to Japan in 1895 as a result of the First Sino-Japanese War, and
became a Japanese colony for fifty years until Japan was defeated in World
War II in 1945 .22 At the end of World War II, the troops of Chiang Kai-shek,
President of the Republic of China and Director-General of the KMT as well
as the Supreme Allied Commander in Asia at that time, took control of
Taiwan on behalf of the Allied Forces in 1945. Followed by Chiang's defeat
in the Chinese Civil War, the KMT-led government of the Republic of China
declared martial law in Taiwan in May 1949, and then in the same year
retreated from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan. The KMT continuously
ruled Taiwan, Penghu, and several outlying Fujianese islands for fifty-five
years23 until the DPP won the presidential election in 2000.24 The KMT
imposed authoritarian rule on.1the Taiwanese people from 1949 until martial
law was lifted in 1987. 25 This crucial political reform opened up a new era
of liberalization and democratization for Taiwan.26 Later, opposition parties

21 See Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century:
Toward a Liberal
and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 531, 531-39 (2002); see also X. Xiao-Planes, Of
Constitutions and Constitutionalism: Trying to Build a New Political Order in China, 1908-1949, in

BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM

IN CHINA (Stephanie Balme &

Michael W. Dowdle eds., Palgrave

Macmillan 2009) (discussing the X1AN FA as a political compromise and the later enactment of the
Temporary Provisions during the period of Communist Rebellion). The Temporary Provisions removed
constitutional constraints imposed on the President and effectively allowed for a one-party state with no
independent constitutional structures.
22 See Republic of China Yearbook 2009 [hereinafter "2009 Yearbook"], GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION OFFICE, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ch03.html#Historyoffaiwan
(last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
23 See Cheng-jung Lin, The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Lack of Conclusions on Taiwan's
International
Status,
TAIWAN
NEWS,
Sept.
10,
2001,
available
at
http://www.twhistory.org.tw/20010910.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); see also Nien-tsu (Nigel) Li.
Nishuixingzhou de Xianzheng-Taiwan Jieyan Ershi Nian Huigu Xianfa Laishilu [The Constitution:March
Forward or Be Swept Away-The Post-Martial-Law Path 20 Years On], 23 SI Yu YAN: RENWEN YU
SHEHUIKEXUE ZAZHI [THOUGHT AND WORD: J. HUMAN. & Soc. Scl.] 1, 3 (2008).
24 See 2009 Yearbook, supra note 22. The DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, was elected in 2000 and
reelected in 2004. Id. However, the KMT returned to power after its candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won the
presidential election of 2008. Id.
25 See Wang, supra note 21, at 537-38. Parenthetically, Chiang Ching-Kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son,
was the President at the time.
26 Id. at 538; see also Sean Cooney, Why Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's "One
Country Two Systems" Model for Reunification with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 497, 518 (1997);
Li, supra note 23, at 2-3.
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were legalized in 1989,27 and many restrictions on public discourse were
eliminated. Beginning in 1991, various general elections have been held
regularly.28 Taiwan has been a liberal democratic state ever since.29
The complex political transition (from colonial rule to authoritarian
reign to democracy) has inevitably affected Taiwan's laws and its legal
system. Take the current Constitution of Taiwan (which is also the
Constitution of the Republic of China),30 for example. As originally drafted,
the central government, according to Sun Yat-sen's political doctrines,31 is
separated into five branches ("Yuan")-the Executive, Legislative, Judicial,
Examination, and Control Yuans, 32 with the President 33 and the National
Assembly34 outside the five-power scheme. Among them, the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial Yuans correspond to the conventional
Montesquieuan framework.35 As to the Examination and Control Yuans, the
former takes charge of entry into the civil service, and the latter is
responsible for audit as well as impeachment of public officials. 36
Meanwhile, the government is divided into central, provincial or municipal,
and district levels.37
In addition to a complicated political structure, the legitimacy of the
1947 ROC Constitution was also called into question-at least during the
27 However, the DPP was already founded in 1986. See Tom Ginsburg, Confucian
Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 763, 770 (2002) [hereinafter "Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism"]
28 For example, the first election for all Representatives of the National Assembly was held in 1991;
the first election for all Legislators was held in 1992; and the first direct elections for President and Vice
President occurred in 1996, where the KMT candidates Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan were elected. See
2009 Yearbook, supra note 22.
29 See Wang, supra note 21, at 539; see also Cooney, supra note 26, at 518.
30The Constitution was enacted in 1946 and went into effect in 1947 in China. See GINSBURG,
JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 9, at 111; MINGUO XIANFA (1947).
31 See DENNY Roy, TAIWAN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 84 (Cornell Univ. Press 2003).
32 MINGUO XIANFA arts. 53-106.
33 The President is the head of the state and serves a six-year term with a two-term limit. MINGUO
XIANFA arts. 35, 47. The President's promulgation of laws and orders requires the countersignature of the
head of the Executive Yuan (the Premier). MINGUO XIANFA art. 37. Meanwhile, his or her appointment to
the Premier requires the consent of the Legislative Yuan. MINGUO XIANFA art. 55(1); see also Wang,
supra note 21, at 541.
34 The National Assembly is a popularly elected body that is empowered to elect or recall the
president or vice president and to amend the Constitution. MINGUO XIANFA art. 27; see also Wang, supra
note 21, at 541.
35 These three branches represent the state's highest administrative, legislative, and judicial organs
respectively. MINGUO XIANFA arts. 53, 62, 77; see also Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism,supra note
27, at 768 n. 8.
36 MINGUO XIANFA arts. 83, 90; see also Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism, supra note 27, at
768.
37 MINGUO XIANFA arts. 107-11, 112-20, 121-28. Because the Constitution establishes an extremely
complex political structure, some have argued that the structure is more suitable for governing a huge
country, such as China, than a small island such as Taiwan. See Cooney, supra note 26, at 514.
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authoritarian regime. First, the Constitution was imposed from outside
Second, the
without the Taiwanese people's consent or approval.
government was dominated by the "Mainlanders" (approximately 13% of
the population) 38 despite the fact that the "native Taiwanese" were the
overwhelming majority (around 87% of the population).
Over and above these controversies, however, the 1947 ROC
Constitution has never been completely enforced in Taiwan for several
reasons. First, the National Assembly enacted the "Temporary Provisions
Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion" ("Temporary
Provisions") in China in 1948.40 These Temporary Provisions suspended
many provisions of the Constitution, and strengthened the President's
powers 41 until their abolishment in 1991.42 Second, the Constitution itself
has been amended seven times since 1991.43 Although these amendments
(known collectively as the "Additional Articles") preserve the original text
of the Constitution, they have reshaped the government structure along with
political practice significantly. 44
A good example is the central government. Under the 1994 and 1997
Additional Articles, the President is directly elected by the Taiwanese
citizens, and serves a four-year term with a two-term limit. The President's
promulgation of the personnel orders does not require the Premier's
countersignature any more, and the President's appointment of the Premier
also no longer requires the consent of the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, the
38 "Mainlanders" (Waishengren, literally "people from other provinces") refers to people who were
born in China and emigrated from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan after 1945. See Wang, supra note 21, at
535, 537; see also GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 108.
39 "Native Taiwanese" (Benshengren, literally "people of this province") refers to the people who
inhabited Taiwan before 1945, and their descendants. See Wang, supra note 21, at 535.
40 Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan [the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period
at
available
"Temporary
Provisions"],
[hereinafter
Communist
Rebellion]
of
http://en.wikisource.org/wikilTemporaryProvisionsEffectiveDuring.thePeriod oLCommunistRebell
ion (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
41 For example, the Temporary Provisions facilitated the President's ability to issue the emergency
orders, empowered the President to create extra-constitutional agencies, and suspended the two-term limit
on the presidency. See Temporary Provisions, supra note 40, at arts. 1, 3, 4; see also Wang, supra note 21;
Cooney, supra note 26, at 515; GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REvIEw, supra note 7, at 113-15.
42 See sources cited supra note 38. Parenthetically, Lee Teng-hui, Chiang Ching-kuo's successor,
was President at the time.
4 The Constitution was revised in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2005. However, the
Council of Grand Justices declared the 1999 Additional Articles unconstitutional and void because the
Amendments permitted Representatives of the National Assembly to extend their own terms for almost
three years. See Zhonghuaminguo Xianfa Zengxiutiaowen [The Additional Articles of the Constitution of
the Republic of China], available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/news/additional.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2009) [hereinafter "XIAN FA, Additional Articles"]; see also Interpretation No. 499 (March 24, 2000),
Judicial Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
4 See Cooney, supra note 26, at 520; see also Wang, supra note 21, at 542.
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President has the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan when it passes a noconfidence vote against the Premier.45 This shows that Taiwan has adopted a
semi-presidential system since 1997.46 However, unlike other semipresidential countries, Taiwan has neither a constitutional mechanism nor a
provision requiring the President to take into account the parliamentary
election results in choosing the prime minister,47 nor a political culture of a
strong legislature, such as the French tradition, 48 urging the President to
accept "cohabitation."49 As a result, Taiwan experienced a chronic political
deadlock between the executive and the legislature when DPP President
Chen Shui-bian refused to cohabitate with the opposition coalition (referred
to as the "Pan-Blue" Alliance 5), which dominated the Legislative Yuan over
his terms (2000-2008).
According to the 1992 and 2000 Additional Articles, the status of the
Control Yuan has also been considerably altered because it is no longer a
popularly elected body, and now its members, as well as the Grand Justices
of the Judicial Yuan and the Members of the Examination Yuan, are all
appointed by the President with the consent of the Legislative Yuan.52 Even
more dramatically, the 2005 Additional Articles abolished the National
Assembly,53 and set a very high threshold for constitutional amendments.5 4
Since then the Constitution has been extremely difficult to change.
As to the transformation of the judicial branch, under the Constitution,
the Judicial Yuan, as the highest judicial organ, has the powers of: 1)
45 See X[AN FA, Additional Articles (1994), XIAN FA, Additional Articles (1997), supra note 43; see
also Zhonghuaminguo Xianfa Zengxiutiaowen Lifayange [Legislative History of the Additional Articles of
Republic
of
China],
Constitution
of
the
the
http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgillglaw?@50:1804289383:f:NO%3DE04105*%200R%20NO%3DBO4105$$11$$$
PD%2BNO (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); see also X1AN FA, Additional Articles, supra note 43, at arts. 2(1),
2(2), 2(6), 3(1), 3(2).
4 For a detailed discussion, see Thomas Weishing Huang, The PresidentRefuses to Cohabit: Semipresidentialism in Taiwan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 375, 375-402 (2006) [hereinafter Huang, The
PresidentRefuses].
17

Id. at 387.

4s The tradition of a strong legislature existed at least between the Third and Fourth Republics. See
Huang, The PresidentRefuses, supra note 46, at 386.
Id. at 385, 387.
SO This alliance was formed by the KMT and the People First Party ("PFP"). See BackgroundNote:
Taiwan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIA AND PAC. AFFAIRS (updated Apr. 30, 2010),

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
SI See Huang, The President Refuses, supra note 46, at 386.
52 See XAN FA, Additional Articles, supra note 43, at arts. 5(1), 6(2), 7(1), 7(2).
" Id. atart. 1.
5 Id. at art. 12 ("Amendment of the Constitution shall be ... passed by at least three-fourths of the
[legislators] present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the Legislative
Yuan, and sanctioned by electors . .. at a referendum . . . wherein the number of valid votes in favor
exceeds one-half of the total number of electors. . . .").
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adjudicating civil, criminal, and administrative cases, and cases concerning
disciplinary measures against public officials,55 and 2) interpreting the
56
Constitution as well as unifying the interpretations of laws and ordinances.
However, the 1997 and 2005 Additional Articles have expanded the power
of the Judicial Yuan57 by empowering the Grand Justices to adjudicate cases
relating to the impeachment of the President or the Vice President, and
concerning the dissolution of unconstitutional political parties. In order to
safeguard judicial independence, the Additional Articles have also prohibited
the Executive Yuan from eliminating or reducing the annual budget proposal
of the Judicial Yuan since 1997.59
The Council of Grand Justices can play a significant role in the
following scenarios: 1) dealing with the "most contentious moral and
political issues," as do its counterparts in other democracies,o 2) being an
arbiter when a political deadlock occurs between the executive and the
legislature under the present semi-presidential system,61 3) interpreting the
Constitution authoritatively, especially when it becomes very difficult to
amend, and 4) deciding some of the most politically controversial cases
(e.g., impeaching the President or dissolving an "unconstitutional" political
party). Unsurprisingly, it has become a more coveted object for various
political, economic, and judicial actors than ever.62 Even so, one must not
neglect that in the authoritarian era, the Council operated as an instrument of
the KMT regime, rather than a guardian of the Constitution. 63 The most
5s MINGUO XIANFA art. 77. However, in practice, those cases are adjudicated by the ordinary court
system, the Administrative Courts, and the Commission on the Disciplinary Sanction of Functionaries,
which are outside the Judicial Yuan but under its supervision. Because these practices have made the
Judicial Yuan "the highest judicial administrative organ," rather than the highest judicial (adjudicative)
organ, the related laws were declared unconstitutional in 2001. See Interpretation No. 530 (Oct. 5 2001),
Judicial Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
56 MINGUO XIANFA art. 78. The power of judicial review lies with the Council of Grand Justices, a
component of the Judicial Yuan. See Wang, supra note 21, at 545; see also Ginsburg, Confucian
Constitutionalism,supra note 27, at 768.
57 See Huang, JudicialActivism, supranote 17, at 4.
5 See XIAN FA, Additional Articles, supra note 43, at art. 5(4).
5 See XIAN FA, Additional Articles, supra note 43, at art. 5(6) (1997).
6 See Ran Hirschl, Book Review: Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in
Asian Cases by Tom Ginsburg, 13 L. & POL'Y BOOK REV. 1 (2003), available at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/Ginsburgl203.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter Hirschl, Book Review].
6 A good example is Interpretation No. 632, which was filed by the DPP legislators because the
Pan-Blue-dominated Legislative Yuan had refused to exercise its consent power over President Chen's
nominees of the Members of the Control Yuan for more than two and a half years. The Council finally
ruled the action of the legislature unconstitutional. Interpretation No. 632 (Oct. 15 2007), Judicial Yuan
Interpretations, supra note 14.
62 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTrfUTIONALISM 11-12 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter HIRSCHL, TOwARDS JURISTOCRACY].
63 See Wang, supra note 21, at 545; see also GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 9, at 130-34.
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infamous example was Interpretation No. 31 of 1954, in which the Council
allowed the Members of the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan and National
Assembly elected in China in 1948 to remain in power for more than forty
years.64
Unlike the judicial appointment mechanism in Germany, Italy,
Portugal, or Spain,65 a de facto quota system does not exist in Taiwan. That
is to say, there is no mechanism for Taiwan's political parties to select the
Justices according to their seats in the Legislative Yuan or their relative
importance in the Taiwanese society. Therefore, it is relatively difficult to
identify a particular Justice with a political party, at least compared with the
German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish cases. 66 Moreover, career judges in
Taiwan are forbidden to have party affiliations, 6 7 so it is even more difficult
to recognize a Justice's party preferences if he or she used to be a career
judge. However, even without a party quota system, practically speaking,
the president still needs to take the general election results, along with his or
her own approval rate, the Justice nominee's reputation, etc., into account.
Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, fifty Grand Justices have
served on the bench. Except the five Justices newly appointed by President
Ma Ying-jeou, 69 our research covers the other forty-five Justices 70 who were
respectively appointed by President Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1985 (i.e. the fifth
term), by President Lee Teng-hui in 1994, 1999 (i.e. the sixth term), and by

6 See Wang, supra note 21, at 543-44; see also Interpretation No. 31 (Jan. 29 1954), Judicial Yuan
Interpretations, supra note 14. However, the Council eventually overturned Interpretation No. 31. See
Interpretation No. 261 (June 21, 1990), Judicial Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
5 See Nuno Garoupa, The Politicization of the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: Empirical
Evidence, in EMPIRICAL JUDICIAL STUDIES (Kuo-chang Huang ed., 2008).
' See id.
67 MINGUO XIANFA art. 80; see also OAJY, supra note 14, at art. 5.
Otherwise, his or her nominees may be voted down when there is an opposition-controlled
Legislative Yuan (as there was under DPP President Chen). A good example took place in 2007 when,
among the eight Justice candidates nominated by President Chen, only four were approved by the PanBlue-dominated Legislative Yuan. See Shih Hsiu-chuan, Four Grand Justices Approved, Four Rejected,
TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/09/28/2003380727
(last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
6 See Shih Hsiu-chuan, Legislators Approve Ma's Five Nominees Despite DPP Boycott, TAIPEI
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/04/2003424994/wiki (last
visited Nov. 16,2010).
7o One must note that we have only forty-four of them in our dataset. The reason is that Fan ShinShiang, a former Supreme Court female judge and also a Chiang's Mainlander appointee, did not attend the
court meetings after July 1987 due to suffering from liver cancer, and eventually dying in November 1987.
Therefore, we do not include her in the dataset. See Council for Cultural Affairs of the ROC, Taiwan Lishi
Cidian
[Dictionary
of
the
Taiwan
History],
http://nrch.eca.gov.tw/ccahome/website/site20/Contents/009/cca220003-li-wpkbhisdict).2006-0612-u.xmi
(last visited Sept. 15, 20 10) (in Chi nese).
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President Chen Shui-bian in 2003 as well as in 2007.71 Among them,
twenty-three Justices used to be Supreme Court judges of the ordinary court
system (OAJY art. 4.1.1); nineteen used to be law professors (OAJY art.
4.1.3); two were senior prosecutors; and only one was a legislator (OAJY
art. 4.1.2). 72 In addition, 81% of Chiang's appointees were Mainlanders; on
the contrary, 79% and 74% of Lee and Chen's appointees respectively were
native Taiwanese. Obviously, the China-born President Chiang tended to
select Mainlanders as Justices, despite the fact that they only represented 1315% of the population. Contrarily, native-born Presidents (i.e. Lee and
Chen) tended to appoint more native Taiwanese to the bench, even though it
still did not reflect the population ratio.
As mentioned above, the Grand Justices, as a whole, now have the
following powers: 1) to interpret the Constitution, 2) to unify the
interpretations of laws and ordinances, 3) to adjudicate cases relating to the
impeachment of the president or the vice president, and 4) to declare the
According to the
dissolution of unconstitutional political parties.7
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act of 1993 ("CIPA"), different
procedures apply in the above different powers.74 In short, the Council
conducts abstract review in the first two categories of jurisdiction, and forms
a Constitutional Court to hear the last two types of "cases or controversies"
(i.e. to exercise concrete review). 5 Considering, first, that there is no case
of the impeachment of a president or vice president or the dissolution of an
unconstitutional party so far, and second, that interpreting the Constitution is
the core of constitutional review, our research thus concentrates on the
Justices' interpretations ruled under Article 5 of the CIPA76 -especially all
71 See

Justices

of

the

Constitutional

Court-Judicial

Yuan,

Former

Justices,

http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/pOl04.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); see also, Justices
of
the
Constitutional
Court-Judicial
Yuan,
Justices,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourtlenIp0l_03.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
72 OAJY, supra note 14, at art. 4. 'To be eligible for appointment as a Justice of the Constitutional
Court, a candidate must: (1) have served as a Justice of the Supreme Court for more than ten years ... ; or
(2) have served as a Member of the Legislative Yuan for more than nine years ... ; or (3) have been a [law]
professor ... for more than ten years . . ; or (4) have served as a Justice of the International Court, or have
had authoritative works published in the fields of public or comparative law; or (5) be a person highly
reputed in the field of legal research and have political experience. The number of Justices qualifying under
any single qualification listed above shall not exceed one third of the total number of Justices." Id.
7 See MINGUO XIANFA arts. 78-79; see also XIAN FA, Additional Articles, supra note 43, at art. 5.
71 See
Constitutional
Interpretation
Procedure
Act
of
1993
("CIPA")
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009)
[hereinafter "CIPA"].
7 See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 468.
76 CIPA, supra note 74, at art. 5.1. "A petition for an interpretation of the Constitution may be filed
under one of the following circumstances: (1) Where a central or local government agency is uncertain
regarding the application of the Constitution in exercising its powers, or, where the agency, while

JANUARY 2011

EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW INNEW DEMOCRACIES

15

the cases filed under Articles 5.1.1 and 5.1.3 (in these cases the petitioners
are either the central government, local governments or at least one-third of
legislators), as well as a few cases which are also party politics-related, filed
under Articles 5.1.2 and 5.2 (in these cases the petitioners are individuals,
legal persons, political parties, or judges of the other courts77 ) 78
Although an individual or a judge of the other courts may file a
petition for a constitutional interpretation under Articles 5.1.2 or 5.2 of the
CIPA, one must note that it is not concrete review under the "American"
model because the Council cannot directly declare a court's final decision
unconstitutional as the Supreme Court of the United States or Japan can.79
Instead, the Council can only interpret the constitutionality of the laws,
regulations, or legal precedents on which the court's decision is based.so
Furthermore, although our research mainly focuses on those cases filed
under Articles 5.1.1 and 5.1.3 of the CIPA on account of their political nature
and importance, in fact, the cases filed by individuals (i.e. the cases of
Article 5.1.2) still form a vast part of the Council's docket.
exercising its powers, is in dispute with another agency regarding the application of the Constitution, or
where the agency is uncertain of the constitutionality of a particular law or order when applying it; (2)
Where an individual, a legal person, or a political party, having exhausted all judicial remedies provided by
law, alleges that her/his/its constitutional rights have been infringed upon and thereby questions the
constitutionality of the law or order applied by the court of last resort in its final decision; (3) Where the
members of the Legislative Yuan, in exercising their powers, are uncertain regarding the application of the
Constitution or regarding the constitutionality of a particular law when applying the same, and at least onethird of the members of the Legislative Yuan have filed a petition." Id. Besides, since Interpretation No.
371 expanded the application of art. 5.2, now when any judge of any court sincerely believes the statute or
regulation at issue before the court is in conflict with the Constitution, the court may adjourn the
proceedings and petition the Constitutional Court to interpret the constitutionality of the said statute or
regulation. Interpretation No. 371 (Jan. 20 1995), Judicial Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
Additionally, unlike the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Grand Justices have no discretion when
determining which cases they would like to hear. In other words, the Grand Justices have to deal with all of
the petitions unless a petition does not meet the requirements of CIPA and, in that case, the Council should
dismiss the case without issuing any interpretation.
7 They include the ordinary court system, the Administrative Courts, and the Commission on the
DisciVlinary Sanction of Functionaries. See sources cited supra note 53.
8 Out of ninety-seven decisions in our dataset, seven were filed under Article 5.1.2 and one under
Article 5.2; hence, the remaining eighty-nine decisions were filed under Articles 5.1.1 and 5.1.3.
' In addition to this difference, there are other distinctions between the Council and the Supreme
Court of the United States or Japan. For example, in Taiwan the President, the other four Yuans, or even
one-third of legislators have the right to challenge, on an "abstract" basis, the constitutionality of laws
enacted by the Legislative Yuan. In this case, many of the "cases or controversies" doctrines that form an
important part of the U.S. constitutional jurisprudence cannot be naturally applied.
g See CIPA, supra note 74, at art. 4; see also Interpretations Nos. 154, 271, 374, 569, 582, Judicial
Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
'1 For example, in the fifth and sixth terms, 97% and 92% of petitions respectively were filed by
individuals. In addition, 72% and 75% of interpretations, based on the cases filed by individuals, were ruled
on.
See
Statistics,
AMW 19i$#
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/E100/M-)i7g
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An absolute majority of votes is required to declare a constitutional
interpretation. More specifically, prior to 1993, an interpretation could only
be adopted by the votes of a three-fourths majority of those attending
Justices with a quorum consisting of three-fourths of all Justices. 2 In 1993,
the CIPA was amended; an interpretation can now be adopted by the votes of
a two-thirds majority of those attending Justices with a quorum consisting of
two-thirds of all Justices.83 Before 1993, those Justices who had separate
opinions could only issue so-called "dissenting opinions," even though they
agreed with the ruling and only had opinions about the reasoning.84
However, since 1993, the Justices who have separate opinions can issue
either concurring or dissenting opinions, and those opinions are proclaimed
along with the interpretations of the Council.
Under the Constitution, the Council has the power to declare laws and
However, similarly to other
ordinances unconstitutional and void.
German
the
(e.g.
courts
constitutional
"Kelsenian"
"Bundersverfassungsgericht" and the Austrian "Verfassungsgerichtshof'),
the Council does not always explicitly declare a law or a governmental
action unconstitutional or invalid even when the law or the action is not in
conformity with the Constitution.87 For example, in Interpretation No. 419
of 1996, although the Council did not proclaim that the status of the Vice
President concurrently serving as Premier of the Executive Yuan was
apparently unconstitutional, it still concluded that this situation was
"constitutionally inappropriate."8 Another example is Interpretation No.
530 of 2001. In this interpretation the Council struck down the related laws
including the OAJY, the Organic Act of Court, and the Organic Act of the
Administrative Court, but it did not declare them immediately void and
A)mit@ Z~ikf
http://www.judicialgov.tw/constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/E100/,T-ItMEiM)\)ANf
$18li.htm (in Chinese) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
82 See The Act of the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan of 1958 art. 13(1), available at
(in Chinese) (last
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p07_2_one.asp?lawno=61&types=all
visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter "ACGJ"].
8
See CIPA, supra note 74, at art. 14(1).
8
See ACGJ, supra note 82, at art. 17.
85 See CIPA, supra note 74, at art. 17. However, it is important to note that the Justices vote secretly.
Therefore, if a Justice's vote turns out to be a minority but he or she refuses to write any separate
(especially dissenting) opinion then, according to the public record, his or her vote will still be counted as a
majority. In this case, one might interpret that the specific Justice changes his or her opinion afterward. Or
more likely, the Justice tends not to publish his or her opinion since there are different political parties and
interest groups that have lobbied the judge before the vote and the justice does not want to publicize his or
her individual decision.
86 See MINGUOOXIANFA arts. 171, 172.
87 See Interpretation No. 419 (Dec. 31 1996), Judicial Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.
n See id.
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instead granted the Legislative Yuan two years to revise the laws.89 These
two examples have shown that the Council usually plays a cautious and selfrestricted role when encountering other branches of the government or
important political actors. In return, the government(s) and political parties
in Taiwan generally will respect the decisions of the court. A good example
is Interpretation No. 419. Although the Council did not explicitly prohibit
the Vice President from serving as the premier simultaneously, after this
Interpretation was released, then-Vice President Lien Chan still resigned his
post as the premier. Of course, there are a few exceptions as well. For
instance, in Interpretation No. 530, the Council demanded the Legislative
Yuan to amend the unconstitutional laws in two years. However, nine years
have passed. The legislature has not done anything yet.
With the exception of our paper, we are not aware of empirical studies
on the relationship between Grand Justices and party politics. In fact, the
only relevant paper that we have found is an empirical study of the Justices'
separate opinions. 90 That paper has shown: 1) lowering the decision
threshold had a positive relation to the appearance of dissenting opinions, 2)
the appearance of dissenting opinions in "abstract interpretations" (i.e. the
cases of articles 5.1.1 and 5.1.3 of the CIPA) is vastly higher than that in
"concrete interpretations" (i.e. the cases of articles 5.1.2 and 5.2 of the
CIPA), and the number of separate opinions in "abstract interpretations" is
more than that in "concrete interpretations", 3) reappointed Justices wrote
fewer separate opinions than average, and 4) Justices with backgrounds as
career judges wrote more separate opinions than those with backgrounds as
law professors.
However, these interesting findings do not illustrate the extent to
which the Council, as a "Kelsenian" constitutional court in the emerging
Taiwanese democracy, maintains judicial independence or is inevitably
influenced by party politics as are its counterparts in other democracies, such
as Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and Spain.9 1 Therefore, our research can
be regarded as an initial checkpoint to examine what role the Council has
played for Taiwan on its way towards a dynamic constitutional democracy. 92

8 See Interpretation No. 530 (Oct. 5 2001), Judicial Yuan Interpretations, supra note 14.,
90 Dennis Te-chung Tang, Dafaguanjieshi Butongyijian de Shizhengyanjiu [An Empirical Study of
Separate Opinions in the Council of Grand Justices of Taiwan], in QUANLIFENLI XINLUN: JUANER.
wEIXIANSHENCHA YU DONGTAIPINGHENG [SEPARATION OF POWERS REVISITED: VOLUME II.
CONSTIfUTIONAL REVIEW AND DYNAMIC BALANCE] 427-89 (Yuanzhao Press 2005).
91 See Garoupa,supra note 65.
92 For another example of this literature, see Wen-Cheng Chang, East Asian Foundations for
Constitutionalism: Three Models Reconstructed, 3 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REv. 111 (2009).
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THE DATA AND RESULTS

We have coded ninety-seven decisions of the Taiwanese constitutional
court from 1988 to 2008. We have included all cases that are political in
nature, as explained in more detail in the previous Part. These decisions
have obvious political content and thus do not require second-guessing
concerning the political interests involved. They include all cases of abstract
interpretations (filed under articles 5.1.1 and 5.1.3 of the CIPA) and some
cases of concrete interpretations (filed under articles 5.1.2 and 5.2 of the
CIPA) in that period. 93
The coding of some cases has to address the peculiarities of the
Taiwanese system of concurring and dissenting opinions (also known as
separate opinions), as explained before. At the same time, we have to make
sure that the different political interests are correctly identified. In the
Appendix, we present details of the coding of the controversial cases (i.e.
those that require a more comprehensive explanation concerning the
identification of "concurring" and "dissenting" opinions).94
Our sample of Grand Justices includes forty-four individuals (since
the forty-fifth has not cast her vote in the cases we have coded). The
first-time
gender,
concerning
statistics
descriptive
general
appointment/reappointment, career backgrounds, and origins (i.e.
Mainlander or Native Taiwanese) are summarized in Table One below:
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF TAIWANESE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGES, 1985-2007

Appointed by
Chiang Ching-kuo
(1985)

Appointed by
Lee Teng-hui
(1994; 1999)

Appointed by
Chen Shui-bian
(2003; 2007)

Judges Attribute

15

19

19

Mainlander

12

4

3

Second generation
Mainlander

0

0

2

Native Taiwanese

3

15

14

See supra text accompanying note 78.
See supra text accompanying note 85. Our sample probably underestimates actual dissent so, in
this sense, we studied only reported dissent.
9s See supra text accompanying note 70.
9

9
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Career Magistrate

9

7

8

Law Professor

5

11

9

First Time
Appointment

12

16

13

3(*)

3

6

Female

0

1

3

Male

15

18

16

Reappointment by a
Different President

19

Source: Taiwanese Constitutional Court, 1985-2007
Note: Some judges are counted more than once because they were appointed and reappointed by different
Presidents.
(*) Two were originally appointed by Yen Chia-kan (1976) and one by Chiang Kai-shek (1972).

We have constructed two dependent variables:
1) Dissent in the court: For each decision of the Council, this variable takes
the value one if there is dissent (in the sense of a separate opinion that
disagrees with the decision made by the majority of the court), and zero if
there is no dissent (all Grand Justices agree with the decision made by the
court, even if there are separate or concurring opinions), and
2) Voting for constitutionality: For each individual vote by a Grand Justice,
this variable takes the value one if it upheld constitutionality (hence, a
decision against the petitioner), and zero otherwise (hence, a decision
favorable to the petitioner).
A.

Dissent

We start by a descriptive analysis of dissent rates (number of decisions
with dissent over total number of decisions) in the Council per term. Almost
two-thirds of the decisions in our sample are voted unanimously (even if
they include separate opinions that do not disagree with the decision of the
Council) while slightly more than a third have dissenting votes (that is,
separate opinions that disagree with the outcome derived from the majority
opinion). In the early period of the transition to democracy (1988-1994), the
dissent rate is less than 30%, but it rises up to 50% in the following decade
(1995-2003). And again the dissent rate descends to approximately 20%
during 2004 to 2008 as democracy has taken root. See Table Two below:
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TABLE 2
DISSENT INTHE COURT BY YEARS

Number of
Decisions Without
Dissent

Number of
Decisions With
Dissent

Percentage of

22

9

29.0%

1995-2003

19

19

50.0%

2004-2008

22

6

21.4%

Total

63

34

35.1%

1988-1994

Source: Taiwanese Constitutional Court, 1985-2007; own calculations.
Testing for statistical significance: Pearson Chi-Square Statistics=6.51 (p-value=0.039); degrees of
freedom=2.

In our view, these descriptive results do not support our attitudinal
hypothesis. Dissent rates increase while the Council is fully dominated by
Justices appointed by KMT Presidents. Besides, dissent rates go down
precisely when the Council is dominated by the Justices appointed by DPP
President Chen. These descriptive results seem to be inconsistent with the
attitudinal model.
The regression analysis largely confirms our analysis. The explained
variable is the existence of dissent in the court with respect to a decision.
The explanatory variables include:
1) Petitioneris a KMT supporter. The expected sign of the coefficient is
negative if the political allegiance hypothesis holds; that is, due to the
overwhelming influence of the KMT on the appointment of Grand Justices
in the period, we should expect less dissent when the petitioner is a KMT
supporter.
2) Percentageof the DPP in the Legislative Yuan. This variable controls for

the likelihood that democracy is consolidated. The expected sign of the
coefficient is positive if the attitudinal hypothesis is true; that is, as the
percentage of the DPP in the Legislative Yuan increases, democracy is more
consolidated and the opposition becomes more politically influential, hence,
we expect more dissent.
96 This variable takes the value one if the petitioner(s) is mainly the supporter of KMT and takes the
value zero otherwise. For each case, we have identified the petitioners and have coded supporters of KMT
when there is a direct link to the party. Inevitably there are some subjective judgments in a small handful of
cases, but we are confident that our coding captures the intended effect.
9 These percentages range from 28% in the late 1980s to 32% in 1999. These percentages then jump
to approximately 45% for most of 2000-2007, and back to 24% in 2008. Note that these percentages are
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3) Timing control variables, including President Lee in power (1988-2000)
and time dummies which control, for example, for the 1993 change of the
CIPA concerning the decision threshold and the writing of separate opinions
as well as for the 2000 amendment of the Constitution (effective in 2003)
with respect to Justices' appointment and term in office.
4) Judicial control variables to capture the attributes of the Grand Justices
deciding in each particular decision, including gender (number of female
Justices), previous career (number of career judges and number of law
professors), Mainlanders (number of Justices who are the first and second
generations of Mainlanders), reappointment (number of Justices who were
reappointed), and number of Justices appointed by each of the three
Presidents (i.e. Chiang, Lee and Chen).98
5) Case control variables to capture potential particular characteristics of
each decision, including specific disputes (mainly between central and
regional governments-regional and across different branches of powerbalance of power), 99 and duration of making a decision in months.100
6) Interaction terms between number of Grand Justices appointed by each of
the three Presidents (i.e. Chiang, Lee and Chen)' 0 and whether the petitioner
is a KMT supporter. These interaction variables should capture any
particular bias of Grand Justices appointed by Presidents Chiang and Lee in
favor of the KMT, and appointed by President Chen, on the contrary, against
the KMT.
7) Economic control variables, including annual inflation rate, annual
unemployment rate, and annual Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") per capita.

always strictly less than 50%, which reflects the fact that DPP and its allies have never dominated the
Legislative Yuan.
9
It is important to note that each class is not mutually exclusive because of reappointments and the
fact that some Grand Justices were appointed by previous Presidents. See supra Table 1.
" This variable takes value one if it is a specific case as explained and takes a value of zero
otherwise. Specific cases include all cases in relation to independence of Taiwan, balance of power among
the President, National Assembly, and five branches of government, and power disputes between central
and local governments.
'* Given the small number of cases in our sample resulting from petitions filed under Articles 5.1.2
and 5.2 of the CIPA, these control variables could not be included. CIPA, supra note 72, arts. 5.1.2 & 5.2.
s1Note that there are Justices appointed by previous Presidents so these three variables are not
linearly dependent. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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These variables capture the context under which the court has issued a
decision.102
Due to the fact that some explanatory variables are correlated and due
to the limited number of observations, we have used different specifications
as shown in Table Three below. Usually with this type of logit regression,
we should consider the signal and not place too much emphasis on the
magnitude of the estimated coefficients. In other words, we do not assess
quantitatively the marginal impact of each explanatory variable on the
probability of dissent taking place, but rather it is assessed qualitatively.
Due to the non-independence of the votes within cases (recall that each case
might have more than one decision, that is, each petition might address
several articles of the same law and each article is addressed by a different
decision), we have estimated the different logits with cluster by case (and
not by judge since we are looking at aggregate data). The econometric
package used for the estimation is Stata [version 10].
TABLE 3
LOGIT REGRESSION OF DISSENT IN THE COURT (=1 YES, =0 No)
WITH CLUSTER BY CASE

Coefficients
Number of J. Appointed
by President Chiang
Number of J. Appointed
by President Lee
Number of J. Appointed
by President Chen
N. J. Appointed
by President Chiang &
KMT Petitioner
N. J. Appointed
by President Lee & KMT
Petitioner
N. J. Appointed
by President Chen & KMT
Petitioner
Specific Disputes

Logit 1
0.24
(0.17)
0.03
(0.05)
0.82
(1.44)
0.69
(0.99)

Logit 2
0.31
(0.26)
0.14
(0.21)
0.73
(1.34)

Logit 3
0.35
(0.30)

Logit 4
0.39
(0.35)

Logit 5

0.56
(1.02)

0.32
(0.79)

1.75
(1.50)

0.88
(1.16)

0.62
(1.28)

-5.05
(-1.89)

-1.69
(-0.96)

-1.58
(-1.18)

-0.22
(-0.35)

Logit 6
-1.18*
(-2.09)
1.04
(-1.93)
-0.15
(-0.29)

-0.27
(-0.43)

52 Some of these control variables follow the reasoning exposed in the econometric analysis of
dissent in the High Court of Australia. See Narayan & Smyth, supra note 11. Narayan and Smyth argue
that economic growth could be associated with higher or lower dissent rates. Id. At the same time, more
complex economic environments should be positively related to the level of dissent. Id. Hence, we may
expect unemployment and inflation to have a positive coefficient.
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Disputes on Regional
Powers
Disputes on Balance of
Powers
Number of Female
Number of Career
Magistrates
Number of Law
Professors
Number of Mainlanders
[First & Second Gen.]
Number of Justices
Reappointed
Duration of Case
in Months
President Lee in Power
(1988-2000)
Percentage of DPP in
Legislative Yuan
Party Filing is
KMT "Supporter"
Inflation (annual)
Unemployment (annual)
GDP per capita (annual)

-5.78*
(-2.02)
-0.77
(-0.84)
0.47
(0.48)
-0.18
(-0.13)
-0.36
(-0.42)
-0.00
(-0.05)
-3.71
(-0.98)
-0.40*
(-2.45)
-10.89
(-0.95)
0.77
(1.55)
1.83
(1.13)
-0.11
(-0.39)

-4.79
(-1.81)
-0.79
(-0.89)
0.31
(0.32)
-0.09
(-0.09)
-0.37
(-0.48)
-0.01
(-0.37)
-5.25
(-1.45)
-0.44*
(-2.28)
-1.06
(-1.88)
0.56
(1.20)
1.40
(0.94)
-0.02
(-0.08)

0.22
(0.24)
-0.31
(-0.53)
-1.08
(-0.75)
-1.15
(-1.45)
0.40
(0.88)
-0.49
(-0.37)
0.54
(0.59)
-0.01
(-0.52)
-3.68
(-1.74)
-0.32*
(-2.38)
-9.91
(-1.05)
0.65
(1.41)
1.05
(1.18)
-0.16
(-0.61)

15.37
(1.63)
-40.61
27.62
89

17.76
(1.82)
-42.35
28.43
89

13.55
(1.72)
-45.09
26.48
95

0.29
(0.31)
-0.35
(-0.58)
-1.12
(-0.82)
-1.01
(-1.38)
0.43
(0.97)
-0.50
(-0.40)
0.37
(0.44)
-0.02
(-0.66)
-4.40*
(-2.00)
-0.35*
(-2.27)
-1.19*
(-2.02)
0.59
(1.29)
1.02
(1.12)
-0.12
(-0.46)

15.00
(1.78)
-46.10
23.31
95

Dummy 1994-1999
Dummy 2000-2003
Dummy 2004-2008
Constant
Log Likelihood
LR
Number of Observations
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-5.64**
(-3.15)
-0.81
(-0.84)
0.82
(0.91)
0.58
(0.68)
0.31
(0.28)
-0.02
(-0.88)

-4.95*
(-2.24)
0.69
(1.11)
1.93
(1.82)

-0.24
(-1.90)
-5.49
(-0.76)
0.77
(1.81)
1.84*
(2.00)
-0.16
(-0.60)
6.58
(0.65)
7.10
(0.60)
15.79
(1.42)
-4.28
(-0.42)
-44.31
31.07
97

-0.09
(-1.66)
-1.05*
(-2.10)

7.55
(1.59)
-51.66
17.01
97

Robust z statistics in parentheses

p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The variable petitioner is a KMT supporter has the expected negative
sign but it is not statistically significant, except for two regressions (none of
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the interaction terms is statistically significant). Percentage of the DPP in
the Legislative Yuan has the unexpected negative sign and is statistically
significant for most specifications except for two. These two results suggest
again that the attitudinal model does not capture the patterns of dissent in the
Council; in fact, it seems that there was more dissent during the transition
(while the Council was dominated by KMT Presidents' appointees) and less
once Taiwan's democracy was more robust (when the Council was no longer
dominated by KMT Presidents' appointees). The attributes of the cases, the
political nature of the petitioner, and the particular composition of the
Council seem to have no impact on the dissent rate. Only the political cycle
from transition to more consolidated democracy, as measured by the
percentage of the DPP in the Legislative Yuan, seems to matter.103 The
regression analysis confirms the descriptive statistics of Table 2. The
negative coefficient for female (more women in the Council decreases the
likelihood of dissent) is robust and statistically significant in three
specifications. However, given the small number of female Justices in the
court (see Table 1), we do not emphasize this statistical result.
B.

Voting for Constitutionality
We turn now to the individual votes of each Taiwanese Grand Justice.

We have a total of 1357 observations, 612 for constitutionality and the
remaining 745 for unconstitutionality. An exploratory quantitative analysis
is provided by Table Four. We can see that the Justices appointed by
President Chiang vote in a disproportional way for unconstitutionality when
the petitioner is associated with the KMT (hence the decision favors the
KMT interests). The results are reversed, though, when the Justices are
nominated by the following two Presidents, with particular emphasis for
those appointed by KMT President Lee. This descriptive analysis provides
preliminary evidence that the Justices appointed by KMT President Chiang
(before the transition started) have different behavior from that of the
Justices appointed by KMT President Lee and DPP President Chen.

03 The economic control variables, unemployment and inflation, have the expected sign (positive
coefficient) but they are not statistically significant.
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TABLE 4
FAVORING KMT INTERESTS
Vote for
Constituti
onality
when
KMT is
Petitioner

Vote for
Unconstit
utionality
when
KMT is
Petitioner

Vote for

Vote for

Constituti
onality
when
KMT is
not
Petitioner

Unconstit
utionality
when
KMT is
not
Petitioner

Total
Vote for
Constituti
onality

Total
Vote for
Unconstit
utionality

Appointed by
President Chiang
Appointed by
President Lee
Appointed by
President Chen

33
108
116
67
149
175
(23%)
(77%)
(64%)
(36%)
214
137
86
222
300
359
(61%)
(39%)
(28%)
(72%)
109
160
54
51
(52%)
(48%)
(41%)
(59%)
301
296
311
449
(50%)
(50%)
(41%)
(59%)
Source: Taiwanese Constitutional Court, 1985-2007; own calculations.
Testing for statistical significance: Pearson Chi-Square Statistics=177.66 (p-value-O.0); degrees of
freedom=6.

Our regression analysis takes the explained variable to be a vote for
constitutionality (i.e. against the petitioner). The explanatory variables
include:
1) Petitioneris a KMT supporter.10

2) The Grand Justice is appointed by one of the three Presidents (i.e. Chiang,
Lee, and Chen). 05
3) Interaction terms between the variables concerning which President
appointed the Grand Justice and whether the petitioner is a KMT supporter,
the interpretation being that a Grand Justice appointed by a given President
and confronted with a petition supported by the KMT is more or less likely
to vote for constitutionality.
4) Existence of dissent in the court, measured by the dissent rate.
14 As explained earlier, this variable takes value one if the petitioner(s) is mainly a supporter
of the
KMT and takes a value of zero otherwise. See supra text accompanying note 96.
'os These variables take the value one if the Grand Justice is appointed by President, and a value of
zero otherwise. Note that each class is not mutually exclusive due to reappointments and some Grand
Justices are appointed by previous Presidents. See supra Table 1; see also supra text accompanying notes
97 & 100.
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5) Percentage of the DPPin the Legislative Yuan.

6) Timing control variables, including President Lee in power (1988-2000)
and time dummies (to control for important changes in 1993 and in 2003, for
example).
7) Judicialcontrol variablesto capture the attributes of the individual Grand
Justices deciding in each particular decision, including gender, age at
appointment, previous career, Mainlanders, and reappointment.
8) Case control variables to capture potential particular characteristics of
each decision, including specific disputes (mainly between central and
regional governments-regional, across different branches of powerbalance of power, and related to the independence of Taiwanindependence),106 and duration of making the decision in months.
9) Interaction terms between the different judicial control variables and
whether the petitioner is a KMT supporter.
10) Economic control variables, including annual inflation rate, annual
unemployment rate, and annual GDP per capita. These variables capture the
context under which the court has issued a decision.
The critical variable to test our hypothesis is the interaction term
between the variables concerning which President appointed the Grand
Justice and whether the petitioner is a KMT supporter. As explained, the
interpretation is that a Grand Justice appointed by a given President and
confronted with a petition supported by the KMT is more (if appointed by
the KMT President) or less (if appointed by the DPP President) likely to vote
for unconstitutionality.
If the hypothesis of political allegiance prevails, then the Grand
Justices appointed by the KMT Presidents should help KMT petitioners
(vote for unconstitutionality) while the opposite should happen to the Grand
Justices appointed by DPP Presidents (although probably in a less significant
way as the DPP has never controlled the relevant confirming bodies). For
appointments by KMT Presidents Chiang and Lee, we should expect a

o6 This variable takes the value one if it is a specific case as explained and takes a value of zero
otherwise.
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negative coefficient whereas for appointments by DPP President Chen, we
should expect a positive coefficient.
Due to the fact that some explanatory variables are correlated, we
have used different specifications as shown in Tables Five and Six. Due to
the non-independence of the votes within cases and within decisions (recall
that each case might have more than one decision), we have further
estimated the logit models correcting for the non-independence, in
particular, using clustering on case initially, and then on issue. In addition,
we have also added fixed effects per judge in some specifications.
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TABLE 5
LOGIT REGRESSION OF VOTE FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY (=1 YES, -0 No)
WrrTH CLUSTER BY ISSUE [ALL OBSERVATIONS]
Coefficients
Appointed by
President Chiang
Appointed by
President Lee
Appointed
by President Chen
Party Filing is
KMT "Supporter"
Appointed
by President Chiang
& KMT Petitioner
Appointed
by President Lee &
KMT Petitioner
Appointed by
President Chen &
KMT Petitioner
Female
Career Magistrate
Law Professor
Reappointed
Mainlander
[First & Second Gen.]
Career Magistrate
& KMT Petitioner
Law Professor
& KMT Petitioner
Reappointed
& KMT Petitioner
Mainlander
& KMT Petitioner
Duration of Case
in Months
Specific Disputes
Disputes on Regional
Powers

Logit 1
0.15
(0.40)
0.35
(1.30)
-0.32
(-1.20)
-0.11
(-0.25)

0.05
(0.45)
-0.11
(-0.76)
-0.23
(-1.26)
-0.00
(-0.03)
-0.08
(-0.63)

0.01
(0.43)
0.35
(0.80)

Logit 2
0.78
(1.78)
-0.12
(-0.32)
-0.26
(-0.74)
0.16
(0.28)

Logit 3
0.59
(1.29)
-0.22
(-0.56)
-0.05
(-0.15)
-0.31
(-0.43)

-0.96
(-1.73)

-1.11*
(-2.02)

1.21*
(2.20)

1.54**
(2.72)

-0.42
(-1.05)

-0.56
(-1.55)

0.13
(1.10)
-0.13
(-0.63)
-0.25
(-0.99)
0.08
(0.44)
-0.02
(-0.12)
-0.35
(-1.15)
-0.53
(-1.52)
0.21
(1.14)
-0.38
(-1.89)
0.01
(0.34)
0.39
(0.88)

0.11
(0.95)
-0.10
(-0.50)
-0.21
(-0.82)
0.06
(0.33)
0.03
(0.21)
-0.34
(-1.10)
-0.53
(-1.51)
0.21
(1.07)
-0.38
(-1.87)
-0.00
(-0.10)

1.63
(1.69)

-0.11
(-0.25)

Logit 5
0.19
(1.36)
-0.01
(-0.09)
-0.03
(-0.29)
-0.18
(-0.39)

Logit 6
0.06
(0.10)
0.36
(1.03)
-0.30
(-0.94)
-0.11
(-0.25)

0.05
(0.45)
-0.11
(-0.76)
-0.23
(-1.26)
-0.00
(-0.03)
-0.08
(-0.63)

0.03
(0.32)
-0.09
(-0.64)
-0.19
(-1.24)
0.01
(0.16)
-0.03
(-0.27)

0.11
(1.00)
-0.10
(-0.36)
-0.34
(-1.10)
0.05
(0.57)
-0.05
(-0.45)

0.01
(0.43)
0.35
(0.80)

0.01
(0.42)
0.29
(0.66)

0.01
(0.43)
0.35
(0.80)

Logit 4

JANUARY

2011

Disputes on Balance
of Powers
Disputes on
Independence of
Taiwan
Age at Appointment
President Lee in
Power (1988-2000)
Percentage of DPP in
Legislative Yuan
Dissent in the Court

0.13
(0.29)
0.08
(0.06)
0.00
(0.45)
0.58
(0.35)

0.02
(1.59)
0.30
(0.16)

0.01
(1.23)

0.00
(0.45)

0.33
(0.17)

0.58
(0.35)

-0.01
(-0.15)
0.33
(0.82)

-0.03
(-0.35)
0.14
(0.36)

-0.04
(-0.43)
0.05
(0.12)

-0.01
(-0.15)
0.33
(0.82)

N. J. Appointed by
President Chiang &
A
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0.00
(0.30)

0.00
(0.31)
0.59
(0.35)

-0.02
(-0.24)
0.25
(0.61)

-0.01
(-0.13)
0.33
(0.82)

0.00
(0.40)

C
EEI

I

I

N. J. Appointed by
President Lee &
Appointed by P. Lee
N. J. Appointed by
President Chen &
Appointed by P. Chen
Inflation (annual)
Unemployment
(annual)
GDP per capita
(annual)
Dummy 1994-1999
Dummy 2000-2003
Dummy 2004-2008
Justice Shieh
Justice Wung
Justice Lin

0.00
(1.30)
-0.00
(-1.20)
-0.30
(-1.00)

-0.33
(-1.06)

-0.40
(-1.25)

-0.30
(-1.00)

-0.23
(-0.72)

-0.30
(-1.00)

-0.36
(-0.53)

-0.41
(-0.54)

-0.67
(-0.89)

-0.36
(-0.53)

-0.47
(-0.56)

-0.36
(-0.53)

-0.09
(-0.57)

-0.09
(-0.54)

-0.19
(-1.10)

-0.09
(-0.57)

-0.05
(-0.30)

-0.09
(-0.57)

0.66
(0.79)
1.04
(0.37)
-0.23
(-0.09)
-0.09
(-0.39)
0.08
(0.15)
-0.25
(-1.09)
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Justice Wang

1.45
(0.29)
-853.0
14.85
1357

1.66
(0.31)
-824.8
27.84
1355

3.86
(0.72)
-802.4
35.38

1.45
(0.29)
-853.0
14.85

2.03
(0.53)
-845.8
17.73

-0.08
(-0.22)
0.11
(0.23)
-0.09
(-0.21)
-0.30
(-1.61)
0.40
(1.70)
1.51
(0.30)
-851.8
33.68

1355

1357

1357

1357

64.5%

67.0%

70.0%

64.5%

64.6%

64.0%

Justice Liu
Justice Wu
Justice Tseng
Justice Su
Constant
Log Likelihood
LR
Number of
Observations
Sensitivity Analysis:
Corrected Classified

Robust z statistics in parentheses

***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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TABLE 6
LOGIT REGRESSION OF VOTE FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY (=1 YES, --0 NO)
WITH CLUSTER BY CASE [ALL OBSERVATIONS]
Coefficients
Appointed
by President Chiang
Appointed
by President Lee
Appointed
by President Chen
Party Filing is
KMT "Supporter"
Appointed by President
Chiang & KMT
Petitioner
Appointed by President
Lee & KMT Petitioner
Appointed by President
Chen & KMT Petitioner
Female
Career Magistrate
Law Professor
Reappointed
Mainlander
[First & Second Gen.]
Career Magistrate
& KMT Petitioner
Law Professor
& KMT Petitioner
Reappointed
& KMT Petitioner
Mainlander
& KMT Petitioner
Duration of Case
in Months
Specific Disputes
Disputes on Regional
Powers

Logit 1
0.15
(0.42)
0.35
(1.42)
-0.32
(-1.25)
-0.11
(-0.25)

0.05
(0.56)
-0.11
(-0.84)
-0.23
(-1.37)
-0.00
(-0.03)
-0.08
(-0.62)

0.01
(0.48)
0.35
(0.72)

Logit 2
0.78
(1.86)
-0.12
(-0.33)
-0.26
(-0.76)
0.16
(0.28)

Logit 3
0.59
(1.34)
-0.22
(-0.58)
-0.05
(-0.16)
-0.31
(-0.43)

-0.96
(-1.81)

-1.11*
(-2.07)

1.21*
(2.35)
-0.42
(-1.07)
0.13
(1.32)
-0.13
(-0.65)
-0.25
(-1.04)
0.08
(0.44)
-0.02
(-0.12)
-0.35
(-1.17)
-0.53
(-1.60)
0.21
(1.12)
-0.38
(-1.84)
0.01
(0.39)
0.39
(0.78)

1.54**
(2.80)
-0.56
(-1.58)
0.11
(1.17)
-0.10
(-0.50)
-0.21
(-0.86)
0.06
(0.33)
0.03
(0.20)
-0.34
(-1.11)
-0.53
(-1.58)
0.21
(1.05)
-0.38
(-1.79)
-0.00
(-0.11)

1.63
(1.72)

-0.11
(-0.25)

Logit 5
0.19
(1.44)
-0.01
(-0.09)
-0.03
(-0.28)
-0.18
(-0.40)

Logit 6
0.06
(0.10)
0.36
(1.09)
-0.30
(-0.97)
-0.11
(-0.25)

0.05
(0.56)
-0.11
(-0.84)
-0.23
(-1.37)
-0.00
(-0.03)
-0.08
(-0.62)

0.03
(0.41)
-0.09
(-0.65)
-0.19
(-1.27)
0.01
(0.17)
-0.03
(-0.25)

0.11
(1.32)
-0.10
(-0.37)
-0.34
(-1.12)
0.05
(0.59)
-0.05
(-0.42)

0.01
(0.48)
0.35
(0.72)

0.01
(0.49)
0.29
(0.59)

0.01
(0.49)
0.35
(0.72)

Logit 4
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Disputes on Balance of
Powers
Disputes on
Independence of Taiwan
Age at Appointment
President Lee in Power
(1988-2000)
Percentage of DPP in
Legislative Yuan
Dissent in the Court
N. J. Appointed by
President Chiang &
Appointed by P. C.
N. J. Appointed by
President Lee &
Appointed by P. Lee
NJ TA
. . ppo i nte dA by
President Chen &
Appointed by P. Chen
Inflation (annual)
Unemployment (annual)
GDP per capita (annual)
Dummy 1994-1999
Dummy 2000-2003
Dummy 2004-2008
Justice Shieh
Justice Wung
Justice Lin
Justice Wang
Justice Liu
Justice Wu
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0.00
(0.50)
0.58
(0.37)
-0.01
(-0.17)
0.33
(0.84)

0.02
(1.62)
0.30
(0.17)
-0.03
(-0.42)
0.14
(0.37)

0.13
(0.26)
0.08
(0.06)
0.01
(1.24)
0.33
(0.19)
-0.04
(-0.54)
0.05
(0.12)

0.00
(0.50)
0.58
(0.37)
-0.01
(-0.17)
0.33
(0.84)
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0.00
(0.30)

-0.02
(-0.29)
0.25
(0.63)

0.00
(0.33)
0.59
(0.38)
-0.01
(-0.16)
0.33
(0.84)

0.00
(0.42)
0.00
(1.42)
00
(-1.25)
-0.30
(-1.08)
-0.36
(-0.57)
-0.09
(-0.59)

-0.33
(-1.16)
-0.41
(-0.58)
-0.09
(-0.55)

-0.40
(-1.35)
-0.67
(-0.98)
-0.19
(-1.14)

-0.30
(-1.08)
-0.36
(-0.57)
-0.09
(-0.59)

-0.23
(-0.77)
-0.47
(-0.58)
-0.05
(-0.31)
0.66
(0.83)
1.04
(0.38)
-0.23
(-0.10)

-0.30
(-1.08)
-0.36
(-0.57)
-0.09
(-0.59)

-0.09
(-0.36)
0.08
(0.15)
-0.25
(-1.02)
-0.08
(-0.23)
0.11
(0.24)
-0.09
(-0.22)
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3.86
(0.82)
-802.4
59.85
1355

1.45
(0.32)
-853.0
37.04
1357

2.03
(0.61)
-845.8
45.59
1357

-0.30
(-1.63)
0.40
(1.63)
1.51
(0.34)
-851.8
72.84
1357

70.0%

64.5%

64.6%

64.0%

Justice Tseng
Justice Su
Constant
Log Likelihood
LR
Number of Observations
Sensitivity Analysis:
Corrected Classified

1.45
(0.32)
-853.0
37.04
1357
64.5%

1.66
(0.35)
-824.8
56.57
1355
67.0%
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Robust z statistics in parentheses

p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

As can be seen from Tables Five and Six, only the interaction terms
As to other variables, the vote for
are statistically significant.
constitutionality seems to be random and unexplained by them. The
interaction terms do not have the expected signs according to our political
allegiance hypothesis, except for those Justices appointed by President
Chiang. Nevertheless, the coefficients for those appointed by President
Chen are not statistically significant (which might indicate our reminder of
the fact that DPP has never dominated the Legislative Yuan). The
conclusion seems to be that the Grand Justices who were appointed before
the democratization tended to favor KMT interests. However, during the
transition, the Grand Justices appointed by KMT President Lee had other
concerns rather than favoring the interests of the KMT. As to those
appointed by President Chen, nothing can be said given the weak statistical
results. These econometric results largely confirm the descriptive statistics of
Table Four.10 7
IV.

DISCusSION OF RESULTS

The empirical results do not strongly support the attitudinal model, in
particular for those Justices appointed by President Lee. Dissent seems to be
higher during this period, and consensus seems more prevalent when the
10'7 In order to further support our analysis, we have conducted a similar econometric exercise treating
reappointed Justices as "new" Justices (in other words, rather than forty-four Grand Justices, we now
consider fifty-three Grand Justices). This treatment allows us to exclude the possibility that the previous
results are driven by reappointed Justices with overwhelming representation in the sample in certain
particular time periods. The results are quite similar to the previous treatment in terms of identifying a
statistically significant effect for Grand Justices appointed by President Chiang (negative sign) and
President Lee (positive sign).
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Justices appointed by DPP President Chen are on the bench. The Justices
appointed by KMT President Lee seem to vote against the interests of the
KMT more frequently.
In this Part we discuss these results by providing alternative
explanations. One immediate explanation is the difficult relationship
between President Lee and the KMT itself during President Lee's presidency
from 1988 to 2000. There were several open conflicts between President
Lee and other KMT party members.'os President Lee was viewed by many
in the KMT as a traitor bent on deliberately destroying the party from
within, for reasons having to do with his own political goals (e.g. to promote
the political status of the native Taiwanese). Since the Justices had various
backgrounds and the signal of party preferences was weak and fragmented at
that time, it could be that they were serving one KMT faction against the
others. The KMT was not a monolithic party in the late 1990s, and thus
unsurprisingly the behavior of the Justices reflected these internal tensions
and difficulties.
We do not find this explanation very persuasive for the following
reasons. First, while encountering the challenges of the opponent factions
from time to time, President Lee, (Chairman of the KMT at the time), did
not lose domination over the party until it lost the 2000 presidential election.
Besides, traditionally presidents of the KMT had enormous power due to its
long history of autocracy and paternalism. Hence, it seems unlikely that
President Lee would share his power with other defeated factions when
appointing Justices. Second, since the opponent factions probably did not
have influence on deciding the Justice candidates, it is even more difficult to
imagine why the Justices appointed by President Lee would "serve" those
factions rather than President Lee.
Third, our empirical analysis shows that the Justices appointed by
President Lee disfavored the KMT as a whole, and not only the Lee
administration or a specific faction, far before the decisive rupture between
the President and the party occurred. Therefore, it does not seem very
persuasive that the Justices appointed by President Lee in 1994 intended to
'os Since Taiwan's strongman politics faded away with Chiang Ching-kuo's death, President Lee
could not fully control the KMT as his predecessors could. During his presidency Lee encountered some
significant challenges from other factions of the KMT, such as the KMT chair election of 1988 and the
presidential elections of 1990, 1996 and 2000. However, Lee won every single battle except the 2000
election. Regarding the 2000 election, most people believe that Lien Chan (the KMT nominee and Lee's
successor) lost it mainly because Soong Chu-yu (the PFP candidate, a former KMT member and Lee's
right-hand man) also ran for President and separated the KMT supporters dramatically. This significant
electoral defeat not only ended the KMT's fifty-five year rule in Taiwan but also openly expelled Lee from
the KMT in 2001. Later that same year, Lee founded a new pro-Taiwan independence party called Taiwan
Solidarity Union (TSU), which joined the DPP coalition and is still a part of it today.

JANUARY 2011

EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

35

represent different voices of the KMT factions even before there was a largescale internal conflict in the party; not to mention that in 1994 it was
unforeseeable that the KMT would confront the significant electoral defeat
in 2000 that would cause President Lee to lose control over the party."0
Finally, our results do not show that judicial background has a strong
predictive power concerning the behavior of the Justices. For example, we
control for origins (i.e. a Mainlander or a native Taiwanese) but this factor
has no statistically significant effect on individual behavior.
A second possible explanation would be that President Lee appointed
a moderate coalition of Justices who disfavored the traditional KMT. It is
clear that President Lee entertained appointments in a different way than his
predecessors given the transition to democracy. But when President Lee was
in power, the opposition had limited influence in the Legislative Yuan.
Since the transition to democracy was dominated by the KMT until 2000,
there is no reason to think that the KMT president and legislators would
agree on appointing a moderate coalition of Justices who would
systematically undermine the prevailing interests of the ruling party.
Another possible theory, following the work in other contexts 1 o
would be that the Justices appointed by President Lee switched sides in
order to preserve their jobs. We could use the so-called strategic defection
hypothesis here. However, not only was there no real threat to the survival
of the Council (quite the contrary as we have seen previously), but at that
time the KMT had kept a dominant position for over fifty years. If we see
the behavior of the Justices from the perspective of political survival in an
environment with limited tenure, switching sides to become hostile to the
long-time dominant party does not seem a compelling strategy.
Our explanation is that, faced with a transition from a KMTdominated political regime to a democracy (with the election of an
opposition candidate to the presidency in 2000 and the return of a KMT
president in 2008), the Taiwanese Grand Justices needed to assert their
independence from the other branches of government and gain credible
reputations in order to maximize their influence (i.e. a strategy to promote
juristocracy). Thus, they started dissenting more frequently and individually
voting against the interests of the KMT. Under this hypothesis, dissent in
the Council actually plays a double role. During the political transition,
''9 We have run a third robustness check by dividing the appointees of President Lee by those
appointed in 1994 and those appointed in 1999 in order to control for any particular circumstances that
might have affected the profile of appointees, particularly the emerging open conflict between President
Lee and other factions in the KMT after 1996. The regressions do not show any significant differences.
1o See HELMKE, supra note 12 (discussing Argentina).
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dissent is a sign of increasing independence from the KMT tutelage and can
develop a solid constitutional review process. But once democracy is more
consolidated, dissent becomes a sign of political division in the Council
(between pro-KMT Justices and pro-opposition Justices) and may
undermine the ability of the Council to achieve judicial supremacy. "
There are several possible mechanisms that may explain why dissent
increases the reputation and credibility of Council. One possibility is that
the Grand Justices either value the reputation of independence itself or
consider that it is instrumental in achieving supremacy over other judicial
courts. Dissent signals disaffection with the dominant party, thus reinforcing
the reputation of independence. Furthermore, given the influence of the
KMT in the period and the likely return to power (as indeed happened in
2008), dissent has been a costly signal of independence.
Another possibility is that the Grand Justices appointed by KMT
Presidents had a large variance of preferences in terms of judicial outcomes,
but were awed by the dominance of this long-time ruling party. In this case,
KMT Presidents had little to worry about Justices' personal preferences
because the authoritarian nature of the political regime secured the needed
unanimity. However, when the Council entered the period of democracy, the
Grand Justices dissented more often according to their true preferences.
This also provides credibility to the independence of the court since it
becomes clear that the ruling party can no longer prevent dissent among its
own appointees. In later periods, both parties (KMT and DPP) become more
careful with the selection of Grand Justices according to their political
interests, and hence reduce the prevalence of dissent.
Our explanation proposes the building of reputation and the securing
of legal supremacy as the main explanation for judicial behavior in the
transitional period (either because the Justices care about judicial
independence or because they believe that it is instrumental in satisfying
their individual political goals), but discards the prevalent attitudinal model.
In addition, unlike the strategic defection hypothesis, our explanation
relies on a more collective or collegial interpretation of the role of the
Council (which seems unlikely in Argentina but also can be found in Chile
or in Japan). Part of the argument is that the Justices care about the prestige
and the legitimacy of the Council. At the same time, procedure and voting
mechanisms reinforce the consolidation of the collegial interests in
11In a civil law system, where the judicial courts and the production of coherent legal doctrines are
particularly unsympathetic to dissents from the bench, a specialized constitutional court will inevitably
favor unanimous decisions in order to be regarded as a supreme judicial body. See Garoupa,supra note 65.
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credibility-building. 112 Our story proposes the need for achieving legitimacy
as the main explanation for judicial behavior in the transition.
V.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents an empirical study about the Taiwanese
constitutional court with respect to judicial behavior. We have tested the
hypothesis that judicial behavior is dominated by political allegiance, either
because Justices' preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party
or because they simply would like to show their loyalty to a specific party.
However, our results do not seem to confirm the political allegiance
hypothesis.
The Grand Justices appointed by President Chiang (in 1985) seem to
promote the interests of the KMT more vehemently than all other Justices.
They sat on the bench from the end of the authoritarian regime to the
beginning of the transition. The Grand Justices appointed by President Lee
(in 1994 and 1999), on the contrary, seem to vote against the interests of the
KMT more frequently. They sat on the constitutional court during most of
the transitional time.
We have obtained no statistically significant result for the Grand
Justices appointed by President Chen (in 2003 and 2007), which might not
be surprising if we take into account the fact that they served at the end of
the transition and faced a more liberal democracy (while at the same time the
DPP did not control the Legislative Yuan). They seem to be less inclined to
vote against the interests of the KMT than their predecessors, but this might
well be due to the need to keep some reputation for judicial independence
(since President Chen was supported by the DPP).
Dissent rates increased during the political transition and seem to have
decreased once democracy took root. Our descriptive analysis is supported
by the econometric results showing that dissent rates are negatively related
to the DPP (traditional opposition to the KMT) role in the Legislative Yuan.
The parliamentary gains of the opposition party were stable during the
transition and max out once democracy emerged.
Our interpretation is that politics matter in the Taiwanese
constitutional court, but not in the conventional government-opposition or
left-right dimensions. During the political transition from the authoritarian
regime to democracy, the Council of Grand Justices had to liberate itself
from the KMT tutelage and establish a solid reputation for judicial
independence. As a consequence, Grand Justices appointed by KMT
112

See supra text accompanying note 85.
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Presidents were willing to disfavor the KMT in a more systematic way.
Dissent rates went up to signal independence from the KMT. However, as
democracy has emerged, dissent rates have gone down. Now, as in many
other "Kelsenian" constitutional courts, the Grand Justices need to assert

their independence from the other branches of government by establishing
consensus and sound legal doctrines.
purpose of signaling independence.

Dissent rates no longer serve the

We also observe that the appointment process and other features of the
Taiwanese constitutional court do not generate party quotas or majority
versus minority coalitions as seen in other similar courts. 1 3 This might
reduce the likelihood of the political allegiance to the appointing President
emerging as a solid predictor of Justices' voting behavior. Nevertheless,
along with the end of a political transition and the beginning of a more
consolidated democracy, we might observe more party politics in the
Council of Grand Justices in the near future. 114

113 In addition, we did not find any statistically significant correlation between the Justices' career
backgrounds as law professors and the increase of dissent, as some Taiwanese legal scholars expected.
114 In fact, we speculate that the story of Taiwan's constitutional court will be very different
in the
next decade because of the following factors: (1) the KIT has controlled both the Presidency and more
than 70% of the legislative seats since 2008 (the next elections will not be held until 2012); (2) the DPP is
now reduced to comprise less than 30% of the legislative seats (in this case, they can neither petition for a
constitutional interpretation nor vote down any Justice candidate); and (3) KMT President Ma has already
appointed five Justices to the bench in 2008 and will have a chance to appoint another seven Justices in
2011. For these reasons, we predict that: (1) the KMT will enhance its political influence in every public
sector, including the constitutional court, in the next couple of years; (2) if the DPP and its allies cannot
win the general and presidential elections in the next eight years, they might accept a de facto quota system
of judicial appointments as this option is better than no representation whatsoever; and (3) the
constitutional court will be more cautious when voting against the main interests of the KMT and the
appointees of President Ma will likely be very ideologically different from President Chen or even
President Lee.
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APPENDIX: CODING CONTROVERSIAL CASES
We list all the controversial cases as follows, and explain why some
Justices' dissenting opinions have been coded as the majority opinions in
those Interpretations of the Judicial Yuan ("JYI").
1) Interpretation No. 592: In this case, the majority opinion favors the
petitioner, so their votes have been coded as zero (i.e. unconstitutional). As
to J2's dissenting, he is also favorable to the petitioner, so his vote has been
coded as "0" too. But J14 claims this case should be dismissed (unfavorable
to the petitioner), so his vote has been coded as one.
2) Interpretation No. 585: Although it is not a unanimous decision, we have
not coded J5 and J6's votes otherwise after reviewing their partial dissenting
opinions.
3) Interpretation No. 553: The majority and concurring have been coded as
one. Meanwhile, since J2's dissenting says this case should be dismissed
(also unfavorable to the petitioner), so his vote has been coded as one as
well.
4) Interpretation No. 543: In this JYI, the majority declare that the
regulations in question do not totally fit in with the Constitution and that
they should have been reviewed by the legislators (favorable to the
petitioner), so their votes have been coded as zero. As to J28's dissenting,
he strongly claims the regulations unconstitutional, so his vote has also
been coded as zero.
5) Interpretation No. 520: In this JYI, the majority and concurring have
been coded as one (unfavorable to the petitioner, Executive Yuan). Since
J26 presents a partial concurring opinion, his vote has been coded as the
majority's vote (i.e. one). As to J20, J24 and J28's dissenting opinions,
since they all are strongly against the petitioner, their votes have been coded
as one.
6) Interpretation No. 485: The majority declare the law in question is
constitutional (unfavorable to the petitioners). However, J26's dissenting
opinion is also unfavorable to the petitioners (he claims this case should be
dismissed), so we have also coded his vote as one.
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7) Interpretation No. 450: The majority favor the petitioners, so their votes
have been coded as zero. As to J26's dissenting, since he only disagrees
with the reasoning of the majority, not the conclusion (i.e. the holding) of

the majority, his vote has been coded as zero too.
8) Interpretation No. 419: On issue 1)- whether Vice President may serve
as Premier of the Executive Yuan at the same time-the votes of the
majority have been coded as zero (i.e. unconstitutional) because: (1) unlike
J20 and J28's dissenting opinions (coded: zero), the majority does
not say this status is obviously unconstitutional, but they declare it is
constitutionally inappropriate in the end, and (2) after this JYI released,
then Vice President Lien Chan later resigned his post as Premier of the
Executive Yuan.
9) Interpretation No. 290: We have coded the majority's votes as one. As to
J37 and J40's so-called "dissenting" opinions, since they are actually
concurring opinions (they only disagree with the majority's reasoning, not
the holding), these two votes have also been coded as one.

